Tag Archives: Bond Yields

Bond Bear Stops Here: Bill Gross Warns Economy Can’t Support Higher Rates

Having thrown in the towel on his bond bear market call two weeks ago, Janus Henderson’s billionaire bond investor Bill Gross now believes that the most recent bearish bond price (rise in yields) will stop here as the economy cannot support higher yields.

As Gross said two weeks ago, yields won’t see a substantial move from here.

“Supply from the Treasury is a factor in addition to what the Fed might do in terms of a mild, bearish tone for U.S. Treasury bonds,” Gross told Bloomberg TV.

“I would expect the 10-year to basically meander around 2.80 to perhaps 3.10 or 3.15 for the balance of the year. It’s a hibernating bear market, which means the bear is awake but not really growling.”

https://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/inline-images/2018-05-03_7-29-30.jpg

Since then, yields have tested the upper-end of his channel and are breaking out today to their highest since 2011 (10Y)…

https://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/inline-images/2018-05-15_5-48-50_1.jpg?itok=fFNyLeBx

and back to their critical resistance levels (30Y)…

https://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/inline-images/2018-05-15_5-50-55_0.jpg?itok=s6Hc1rhv

And now Gross is out with a pair of tweets (here and here) saying that the record bond shorts should not get too excited here…

https://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/inline-images/2018-05-13_9-26-13.jpg?itok=hqAROAA1

Bill Gross thinks they won’t be right. He highlights the long-term downtrend over the past 30-years, which comes in a 3.22%.

“30yr Tsy long-term downward yield trend line for the past 3 decades now at  3.22%, only ~4bps higher than today’s yield.”

https://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/inline-images/2018-05-15_8-39-58.jpg?itok=aNdSRwTH

“Will 3.22% be broken to upside?” he asks.

“I don’t think so. The economy can’t support yields higher than 3.25% for 30s and 10s, nor 3% for 5s.

Continuing hibernating bond bear market is best forecast.”

Asa ForexLive also notes, if he’s right it doesn’t necessarily mean the US dollar will reverse right away but it would be a good sign for stocks and would limit how far the US dollar might run.

https://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/inline-images/2018-05-15_8-44-38.jpg?itok=MS3UBYGJ

So, will Gross be right? Is this latest spike all rate-locks on upcoming IG issuance? And will this leave speculators with a record short position now wondering who will be the one holding the greatest fool bag by the end of the year…

Well worth your time to hear what geo-economic consultant Martin Armstrong has to say.

Source: ZeroHedge

T-Minus… Prepare For Much Higher Long-Term Rates

It is late.  We have been crunching data for three days, and won’t bore you with too much prose.

We will be back to fill in the blanks in the next few days but will leave you with some nice charts and data to contemplate.  They may help explain why the stock market is trading so poorly even with, what appears, to be stellar earnings.

Determination Of The 10-year Yield

There will be many posts to come on this topic as we believe it is the most critical issue investors need to grapple with and get right over the next year.

What is the right price for the U.S. 10-year Treasury yield?

Moreover,  how is the yield determined, and how has it been distorted over the past 20 years by central banks, both foreign and the Federal Reserve?

What does the future hold?

Capital Flows

We agree that inflation, growth expectations, and other fundamental factors weigh heavily on determining bond yields but we always maintain, first, and foremost,

“asset prices are always and everywhere determined by capital flows.” 

New Issuance,  Foreign, and Fed Flows Into The Treasury Market

The following table illustrates the new issuance of marketable Treasury securities held by the public and net purchases by foreign investors, including central banks, and the Federal Reserve over various periods.

https://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/inline-images/may2_flow-tables.png?itok=3SjVchCQ(larger image)

The data show since the beginning of the century, foreign investors, mainly central banks, and the Federal Reserve net purchase of Treasury securities, those which trade in the secondary market, is equivalent to 60 percent of all new marketable debt issued by the Treasury since 2000.

We do not suggest all these purchases were made directly in Treasury auctions, though many of the foreign buys certainly were.

From 2000-2010, foreign central banks were recycling their massive build of foreign exchange reserves back into the Treasury market.  During this period, the foreign central banks bought the equivalent of 50 percent of the new issuance.  Add foreign private investors and the Fed’s primary open market operations, and the total equated to 70 percent of the debt increase over the period.

Alan Greenspan blames the foreign inflows into the Treasury market during this period for Fed losing control of the yield curve, a major factor and cause of the housing bubble, and not excessively loose monetary policy.

Given the decoupling of monetary policy from long-term mortgage rates, accelerating the path of monetary tightening that the Fed pursued in 2004-2005 could not have “prevented” the housing bubble. – Alan Greenspan, March 2009

Greenspan raised the Fed Funds rate 425 bps from June 2004 to June 2006 and the 10-year barely budged, rising only 52 bps.  More on this later.

Fed Plus Total Foreign Purchases

https://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/inline-images/may2_fed_totalforeign_treasuryborrowings.png?itok=9f8p2oHc(larger image)

https://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/inline-images/may2_fed_cenbank_treasuryborrowings.png?itok=-BvhQgmP(larger image)

During the Fed’s QE period,  2010-2015,  foreign investors and the Fed took down the equivalent of 80 percent of  the new debt issuance.

The charts also illustrate that for several of the 3-month rolling periods, net purchases were significantly higher than 100 percent of new supply, distorting not only the 10-year yield, but the valuation of all other asset prices.

Interest rate repression also cause economic distortions, which have political consequences.  Most notably, wealth and income disparities.

Rapid Technical Deterioration

Since 2015, flows into the Treasury market have deteriorated markedly, and the timing could not be worse as new Treasury issuance is ballooning with skyrocketing budget deficits.

During the past twelve months, for example,  net foreign and Fed flows collapsed to just 17.6 percent of new borrowings.  Even worse, the net flows were negative (we estimated March international flows) during the first quarter during a record new issuance of Treasury securities of almost $500 billion.

Can we say, “Gulp”?

Stock Of Outstanding Treasury Securities

Given the rapidly deteriorating technicals and fundamentals — rising inflation –, we believe the 10-year yield should be and will be much higher sometime soon.

That is we are looking for a “super spike” in bond yields, and expect the 10-year to finish the year between 4-5 percent.   The term premium, which has been repressed due to all of the above,  should begin to normalize.

Why is taking so long?

Aside from the record shorts and natural inertia of markets, the stock of Treasury securities remains favorable, as the bulk is still held by the Fed and foreign central banks, who are not price sensitive.

Debt Stock Shortage,  Debt Flow Surplus 

Ironically,  there remains an artificial shortage of the stock of  Treasuries but now a huge glut in the flow.   See here for a must read.

The Bund And JGB Anchor?

Treasuries are at almost at record spreads on some  maturities vis-à-vis the German bund, and foreigners are on a buying strike as the above data show.

How can an anchor be an anchor if there are no buyers?   One asset arbitrage?

It is also not normal for the 10-year to be trading in such a tight range with a record short position in the futures market.  The average daily move in the VIX has increased from 0.20 percent in 2016, to 1.37 percent in 2017, and shorts are now hardly spooked by a 500 point flop in the Dow.

Something must be going on beneath the earth’s crust.  We have our ideas.

Dollar Strength

The recent dollar strength may be a signal foreigners are getting yield-hungry again, however.   We are not so sure the rally has legs.

Market concerns over the political stability of the U.S may trump yield-seeking for the rest of the year.

How Foreign Flows Contributed To The Housing Bubble

We are not going to spend much time here but we are starting coming around to Mr. Greenspan’s reasoning.  The lack of response of long-term yields to a 425 bps increase in the Fed Funds rate from 2004-2006  greatly contributed to the housing bubble.  The 10-year yield only moved up 52 bps from when the Fed started their tightening to when they paused.

Take a look at the chart.

https://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/inline-images/may2_mortgage-debt_gdp.png?itok=yzXhWh6T

The Fed’s interest rate hikes didn’t even put a dent in the momentum of the housing bubble. Household mortgage debt continued to rise from 60 to 72 percent of GDP from the first interest rate hike before the market collapsed on itself.

Bubbles are hard to pop.

https://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/inline-images/may2_phases-of-housing-bubble1.png?itok=a2Dis-7Z

Why Long-Term Yields Didn’t Respond

Simple.

As, always and everywhere, capital flows or the recycling thereof.

The biggest economic event in the past 25 years, in our opinion, is the exchange rate regime shift that took place in the emerging markets in the late 1990’s.  These countries now refuse to allow their currencies to appreciate in any significant magnitude as the result of capital inflows.

They learned some hard lessons in the mid-1990’s with Mexican Peso and Asian Financial Crisis, and the Russian Debt Default.

Balance of payments surpluses are now reconciled with dirty float currency regimes, where central banks intermittently intervene if their currency becomes too strong.

The result was a massive build of global currency reserves, much of which were recycled back into the U.S. Treasury market in the mid-2000’s.

https://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/inline-images/may2_cenbank_treasury_purchases.png?itok=imSym7al(larger image)

The chart illustrates that foreign central bank net purchases of Treasury securities, alone, were equivalent to the over 66 percent of net Treasury issuance during the Fed 2004-2006 tightening cycle.

International  Reserves Drive Gold

The gold price also ramped with international reserves during this period.

We believe the global monetary base, mainly international reserves,  is the main driver of gold.  See here.

Reserves have not been growing witness the punk trading range in gold.  This may change as the U.S. current account blows out again.

https://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/inline-images/gold-and-monetary-base.jpg?itok=USqHmoCM(larger image)

Current Account And Trade Deficits

The Mnuchin crowd are wasting their time in China trying to negotiate lower trade deficits.  Trade deficits are the result of internal imbalances where investment exceeds savings.  See here for another must read.

Introducing trade distortions to artificially lower the external deficit will only accelerate stagflaton, which is already starting to take hold.  Then we will all be worse off.   See here.

Besides, where is Mr. Mnuchin going to obtain the financing for his proliferating budget deficits if his goal is to run trade surplus or balances with our trading partners?

We are all for better terms of trade and protecting are intellectual property rights,  but know and understand thy national income accounting before starting trade wars.

Upshot

We have laid out why we believe, and we could be wrong, long-term yields are unlikely to behave as they did during the last monetary tightening.   That is the a further collapse in Treasury term premia and a yield curve inversion until something breaks.

Unless the U.S. blows up its current account again,  credit expansion accelerates significantly, creating another blast of capital flows into the emerging markets, to be recycled back to the U.S,,  the foreign and Fed financing of the U.S. budget deficit is over.  Punto!

We are preparing for a significant move higher in bond yields.

What Is The Right Real Yield?

Do you really think with the deteriorating flows in the bond market, coupled with rising inflation warrant a 0.5 percent real 10-year yield?

Au contraire!   We believe a 2-3 percent real yield is closer to fair value.

Tack on another 2.5 percent for inflation,  generous as shortages seem to be breaking out everywhere,  and that gets the 10-year to at least 4 1/2 percent.

Timing

A little CYA.   Yields could move a little lower, maybe to 2.80 percent (a stretch),  given the dollar strength as Europe slows, and shorts get spooked.

Our suspicions, however, it is going to be a hot summer.  Higher interest rates and lower stock prices.

Disclaimer

Now let us add our disclaimer.

Even if all our facts are correct,  our conclusions may be completely wrong.

If you have been reading the Global Macro Monitor over the years, you have probably seen it several times.

To illustrate our point, we like to tell the story Abraham Lincoln used to persuade juries when he was an Illinois circuit court lawyer.

The story goes that Lawyer Lincoln was worried he had not convinced the jury during the closing argument of a civil case against a railroad.   The jurors had gone to lunch to deliberate.  Lincoln followed them and interrupted their dessert with a story about a farmer’s son gripped by panic,

“Pa, Pa, the hired man and sis are in the hay mow and she’s lifting up her skirt and he’s letting down his pants and they’re a fixin’ to pee on the hay.” “Son, you got your facts absolutely right, but you’re drawing the wrong conclusion.”

The jury ruled in Lincoln’s favor.

Stay Frosty, Oscar Mike!

Source: ZeroHedge

Secular Trend In Rates Remain Lower: Yield Bottom Still Ahead Of Us

Donald Trump’s victory sparked a tremendous sell-off in the Treasury market from an expectation of fiscal stimulus, but more broadly, from an expectation that a unified-party government can enact business-friendly policies (protectionism, deregulation, tax cuts) which will be inflationary and economically positive. It doesn’t take too much digging to show that the reality is different. The deluge of commentaries suggesting ‘big-reflation’ are short-sighted. Just as before last Tuesday we thought the 10yr UST yield would get below 1%, we still think this now.

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Business Cycle

No matter the President, this economic expansion is seven and a half years old (since 6/2009), and is pushing against a difficult history. It is already the 4th longest expansion in the US back to the 1700’s (link is external). As Larry Summers has pointed out (link is external) after 5 years of recovery, you add roughly 20% of a recession’s probability each year thereafter. Using this, there is around a 60% chance of recession now.

History also doesn’t bode well for new Republican administrations. Certainly, the circumstances were varied, but of the five new Republican administrations replacing Democrats in the 19th and 20th centuries, four of them (Eisenhower, Nixon, Reagan, and George W. Bush) faced new recessions in their first year. The fifth, Warren Harding, started his administration within a recession.

Fiscal Stimulus 

Fiscal stimulus through infrastructure projects and tax cuts is now expected, but the Federal Reserve has been begging for more fiscal help since the financial crisis and it has been politically infeasible. The desire has not created the act. A unified-party government doesn’t make it any easier when that unified party is Republican; the party of fiscal conservatism. Many newer House of Representatives members have been elected almost wholly on platforms to reduce the Federal debt. Congress has gone to the wire several times with resistance to new budgets and debt ceilings. After all, the United States still carries a AA debt rating from S&P as a memento from this. Getting a bill through congress with a direct intention to increase debt will not be easy. As we often say, the political will to do fiscal stimulus only comes about after a big enough decrease in the stock market to get policy makers scared.

Also, fiscal stimulus doesn’t seem to generate inflation, probably because it is only used as a mitigation against recessions. After the U.S. 2009 Fiscal stimulus bill, the YoY CPI fell from 1.7% to 1% two years later. Japan has now injected 26 doses (link is external) of fiscal stimulus into its economy since 1990 and the country has a 0.0% YoY core CPI, and a 10yr Government bond at 0.0%.

Rate Sensitive World Economy

A hallmark of this economic recovery has been its reliance on debt to fuel it. The more debt outstanding, the more interest rates influence the economy’s performance. Not only does the Trump administration need low rates to try to sell fiscal stimulus to the nation, but the private sector needs it to survive. The household, business, and public sectors are all heavily reliant on the price of credit. So far, interest rates rising by 0.5% in the last two months is a drag on growth.

https://i0.wp.com/www.kesslercompanies.com/sites/default/files/media/images/debt.png

Global Mooring

Global policies favoring low rates continue to be extended, and there isn’t any economic reason to abandon them. Just about every developed economy (US, Central Europe, Japan, UK, Scandinavia) has policies in place to encourage interest rates to be lower. To the extent that the rest of the world has lower rates than in the US, this continues to exert a downward force on Treasury yields.

https://i0.wp.com/www.kesslercompanies.com/sites/default/files/media/images/germus.png

Demographics

As Japan knows and we are just getting into, aging demographics is an unmovable force against consumption, solved only with time. The percent of the population 65 and over in the United States is in the midst of its steepest climb. As older people spend less, paired with slowing immigration from the new administration, consumer demand slackens and puts downward pressure on prices.

https://i0.wp.com/www.kesslercompanies.com/sites/default/files/media/images/oldpop.png

Conclusion

We haven’t seen such a rush to judgement of boundless higher rates that we can remember. Its noise-level is correlated with its desire, not its likelihood. While we cannot call the absolute top of this movement in interest rates, it is limited by these enduring factors and thus, we think it is close to an end. In a sentence, not only will the Trump-administration policies not be enacted as imagined, but even if they were, they won’t have the net-positive effect that is hoped for.  We think that a 3.0% 30yr UST is a rare opportunity buy.

Source: ZeroHedge